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What is remarkable about Descartes' dreams is not that he 
dreamed (for even philosophers presumably dream), but that he wrote 
down a description of his dreams and of his interpretation of them 
and then kept this record* for more than thirty years, until his death. 
What is remarkable, in a word, is that this thinker who prided himself 
on his rationalism and who has come to represent, at least to 
philosophers, the very spirit of rationalism, should have taken his 
dreams so seriously. 
Philosophers -- perhaps because the dreams conflict with 
their view of Descartes, perhaps becausl= they conflict with their view 
of themselves and their discipline -- have tended to play down the 
dreams or to ignore them altogether. Thus, though Bernard Williams, 
the author of the latest volume on Descartes, refers to the dreams 
as "a significant event" he proceeds in a footnote to undercut the 
adjective by quoting Christian Huy gh ens , apparently with approval, to 
the effect that the dreams "shows a great weakness [in Descartes], and I 
think that it will seem much the same to Catholics who have freed 
themselves from bigotry." If we try to free ourselves from what 
1 
seems to be a standing philosophical prejudice against dreams and 
dreaming, what can Descartes' dreams tell us about his theories? --
that is the topic of this paper. But bl=fore I can tackle it, I must 
deal, even if only in a very sketchy and inadequate way, with the 
question, what sorts of procedures exist or can be devised for 
verifying or falsifying interpretations of dreams? 
I 
2 
A dream is a cultural product. 2 So is a painting; so is 
a poem; so is a scientific theory. So far that matter is the ride-
thumbing gesture made by a hitchhiker standing beside the road. In 
interpreting any cultural product whatsoever, we always run the dual 
risks of under-reading -- missing some of the meaning this product 
contains -- and of over-reading -- finding more in this product than 
it contains. How can we avoid these risks? How, when two or more 
readings of the same product conflict, can we ascertain which is the 
more nearly correct? 
I shall begin with a (relatively) simple case. A recent 
article on Monet by Robert Herbert argues that "Monet was not simply 
the instinctual painter of legend. He was, on the contrary, a 
thinking man who was very much in charge of what he was doing.,,3 
Herbert is arguing -- in the language I have just used, that heretofore 
art critics have under-read Monet's paintings: they express more 
than the critics have read in them, because the background structures 
by means of which Monet was organizing the paint on his canvases 
contained elements that these critics are unaware of. 
As supporting evidence for this thesis Herbert offers a new 
interpretation of the "Terrace at Sainte-Adresse." In this painting 
there is much activity at sea; many ships are to be seen -- some sailing 
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ships, some steamers. Herbert maintains that this "parade of shipping 
stands both for the transition between sail and steam and for the 
moment at which Sainte-Adresse was losing its old identity as a 
fishing village and turning into a resort for the moneyed classes 
of Le Harre." 
Is Herbert's interpretation of this cultural product correct? 
Or is the older interpretation, that the ships are in the painting 
simply because they happened to be moving on the sea when Monet was 
standing at his easel? Our answer must turn on whether Monet made 
any independent references to the sociological changes which Herbert 
finds to be expressed in the "Terrace.'" The important word here is 
"independent": it won't do to cite other canvases by Monet in which 
sailing ships and steamers appear. FOIr the ambiguity of the images 
in the "Terrace" (Do the painted images mean merely ships, which 
any fool can see? or do they in addition mean change-from-sail-to-
steam?) is equally present in those other images in those other 
canvases; hence reference to them cannot resolve the dispute. What 
is needed therefore is reference in other media, references which one 
may hope are not involved in ambiguity -- at least, not in the same 
ambiguity -- as the painted images are" Accordingly, we ought to 
search Monet's letters, journals and notes for the year in question4 
for references to the change from sail to steam or from fishing 
village to resort. If we find such references Herbert's interpretation 
is probably correct; without such references we might feel justified 
in concluding that he is probably over--reading. 
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This case is (relatively) simple to settle because it is 
only the reading of the painted images on the canvas that is at issue. 
It is highly unlikely that there will be a dispute about the meaning 
of any verbal statements in the journals and letters. Hence such 
sentences confirm by the presence, or falsify by their absence, the 
disputed reading of the images on the canvas. And note that the 
reading of the images is disputed because they are ambiguous: we 
know part of what they mean (the images mean ships), but we do not 
know how much more they may mean (do they also mean change-from-sail-
to-steam?) • 
But what if all the cultural products that can be offered as 
evidence for a given reading are themselves subject to a variety 
of interpretations? Unfortunately, this is more often than not the 
case. How, for instance, are we to decide whether a hitchhiker's 
gesture expresses optimism or pessimism, or whether it is neutral 
in this respect? The gesture is more like the painted image of the 
ships than it is like the verbal statement we sought in Monet's 
letters. For there is the same sort of ambiguity in the gesture as 
there is in the painted images: Does the gesture mean merely "I want 
a ride," as any fool can see? or does it also mean "Please stop; I am 
very discouraged?" 
It might be thought that the way to decide between conflicting 
interpretations of the gesture would be to follow the procedure 
suggested for the Monet case: we look for a confirming verbal 
statement. Hence we may propose asking the hitchhiker, "Are you 
feeling optimistic or discouraged?" But this is unsatisfactory 
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as a general procedure -- the hiker may refuse to answer; he may lie; 
he may intend to tell the truth but be incapable of describing his 
state of mind accurately. Or he may be unavailable, run down by a 
passing car. In any event, though a verbal statement, if obtainable, 
may be sufficient in this relatively simple case, verbal statements 
may be just as ambiguous as nonverbal cultural objects, such as 
painted images or gestures. 
In lieu, then, of settling this dispute about the hitchhiker's 
state of mind by appeal to his verbal report of what his state of mind 
is, we can make a film clip of his gesture and show it to a randomly 
selected group of observers, asking eaeh of them to rate the gesture 
on an optimism/pessimism scale. If a statistically reliable consensus 
emerges from this procedure -- if there is a distinct clustering of 
ratings at one point on the scale -- we will say that the hitchhiker's 
gesture expressed optimism (or pessimism, or neutrality, as the case 
may be). That is, we define "what the gesture really expressed" 
in terms of the interpretations of a statistically reliable consensus 
of observers. This is something we can hope to discover, and this is 
all that we can hope to discover, about the "meaning" of the gesture. 
It is pointless, then, to think of the gesture as having a meaning 
that is different from what the consensus finds it to be. 
And suppose that we want to find out, not whether the 
hitchhiker was optimistic or pessimistic on this particular occasion, 
but whether he is generally optimistic or pessimistic, i.e., whether 
he has an optimistic or pessimistic di8position, or outlook on life? 
To answer this question we must make film clips of the hitchhiker's 
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behavior on numerous occasions mornings, afternoons, evenings; 
childhood, youth, maturity; work and play. . • • If we show these 
film clips to independent sets of observers and record their ratings, 
we obtain a profile of the following kind, where the x-axis represents 
the optimism/pessimism scale and the y-axis represents the number of 
observations: 
The central tendency of this distribution, whatever it proves to be, 
represents the hitchhiker's disposition. It is hardly necessary for 
me to say that it would be exceedingly tedious to carry out such an 
investigation. But as long as we know how such a study could be 
designed and how it could be executed, we know what we mean by 
attributing such-and-such a disposition to such-and-such an individual. 
And what is more, we know where to look for confirming or disconfirming 
evidence for any interpretation that has been proposed: we look for 
the expression of the background element in question in other media 
and on other occasions. The convergence of independent readings, 
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drawn from a variety of media and from a number of occasions, on someone 
particular reading will tend to support that reading, even if, 
initially, it may have seemed speculative or even implausible. 
This general procedure seems applicable to the interpretation 
of all kinds of cultural products, including the interpretation of 
dreams. For, though the interpretation of dreams is more hazardous 
than the interpretation of other cultural products more exposed 
to the charges of over- and under-reading -- there is no difference in 
principle between the problem of interpreting some dream correctly and 
the problem of interpreting any other eultural product correctly. What 
distinguishes a dream is merely the faet that all of the dream's meaning 
is implicit, the expression of unintended elements in the dreamer's 
background structure, whereas, in the (:ase of other cultural products, 
some -- perhaps most -- of what is expressed is explicit. Nondream cultural 
products, that is to say, are components in Wittgensteinian language 
games, intended to influence the course, of those games. It follows 
that our interpretations of dreams lack the sort of built-in check 
that exists for our interpretations of other cultural products -- the 
check of observing whether our interpre,tations conform to the way 
those cultural products function in the, language games of which they 
are components. 
Accordingly, since our interpretation of dreams lacks this 
kind of check, it seems reasonable, when interpreting any dream, 
(1) to concentrate on those aspects of the dream that are relatively 
straightforward and "surface," and (2) rather than beginning with 
the dream itself, to start with nondream materials -- materials in which 
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one can hope that the submerged elements in the dreamer's background 
structure (those elements which it is our aim to uncover) have been 
expressed more openly and so less ambiguously than in the dream itself. 
II 
I shall therefore begin my attempt to interpret Descartes' 
dreams, not with the dreams themselves, but with two of his best 
known philosophical writings, The Discourse on Method (1637) and the 
Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). The Discourse is particularly 
relevant to our inquiry because it "covers" the period in which the 
dreams occur, but in a very different medium from that of the Olympica 
and at a latter date. The Discourse was in fact a discreet, as it 
were sanitized, version of the whole long voyage of discovery in 
which the dreams were but one, if nonetheless a critical, episode. 
Descartes, he tells us, had been educated "at one of the most 
celebrated schools in Europe," and he had not been judged by his instruc-
tors "inferior" to his fellow students. Yet, on completing his course of 
study, he found himself "embarrassed with so many doubts and errors" 
that the only result of his efforts to instruct himself had been the 
"increasing discovery" of his own ignorance. Having gone through all 
the sciences of his time -- languages, literature, rhetoric, theology, 
philosophy -- without learning anything of consequence, he had then 
turned to travel, to seeing courts and armies, hoping thereby to 
discover the answers he sought "in the great book of the world." But 
alas! he found in the opinions of "other men almost as much diversity 
as [he] had formerly seen in the opinions of phi10sophers."S 
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At this point in his life he ehanced to be in Germany, 
returning from the coronation of the Emperor. Winter overtook him 
in a small village near Ulm "where, sinc:e I had no society to divert 
me, while fortunately I had also no care>s or passions to trouble me, 
I remained the whole day shut alone in a stove-heated room, where I 
had the leisure to occupy myself with my own thoughts," and where he 
"resolved" to make himself "an object of study" and to employ "all 
the strength of my mind in choosing the road I should follow" (H&R, I, 
87). "But like one who walks alone and in the twilight I resolved to 
go so slowly and to use so much circumspection in all things, that if 
my advance was but very small, at least I guarded myself well from 
falling." And he saw that what he needed before trying to advance 
even the first step was "the true Method" of testing all various 
conflicting opinions that he had encountered (H&R, I, 91). 
He had studied logic, geometrical analysis and algebra in 
his youth, and though these sciences were so flawed, at least in the 
state in which he had been taught them, as to be useless, he 
nonetheless thought that some other procedure could be found which, 
"comprising the advantages of the three, is yet exempt from their 
faults." He therefore decided to "borrow all that is best in 
Geometrical Analysis and Algebra, and correct the errors of the one 
by the other." This was so successful that, "in two or three months 
time," he had arrived "at the solution of many questions which he had 
hitherto regard as most difficult" (H&R, I, 92-93). Indeed, his 
success was such that he saw no reason why this extremely simple, 
easily learned method need be confined to mathematics; it could be a 
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universal method applicable to all the sciences. "What pleased me 
most in this Method was that I was certain by its means of exercising 
my reason in all things ••• Not having restricted this Method to 
any particular matter I promised myself to apply it as usefully to 
the difficulties of the other sciences as I had done to those of 
Algebra" (H&R, 1,94). He was then but "three and twenty," and he 
spent the next fifteen years or so in the successful application of 
his method to more and more fields of inquiry -- to optics, to meteors 
to the physical universe as a whole, and to metaphYSics. 6 
I shall first outline the steps of the method and then illustrate 
its use by reference to the Meditations on First Philosophy. The method 
consists in two distinct stages: a stage of analysis and a stage of 
construction. In the stage of analysis we divide any problem with which 
we are confronted "into as many parts as possible." The stage of 
construction consists in arranging these parts "in due order, commencing 
with objects that [are] the most simple and easy to understand, in order 
to rise little by little, or by degree, to knowledge of the most complex" 
(H&R, I, 92). Each of these simple steps, including, of course, the 
first step of all by means of which one lays the foundations for the whole 
subsequent edifice, must be indubitable. That is, the proposition in 
which each step is formulated must contain "nothing more than what is 
presented to [the] mind so clearly and distinctly that [one] could 
have no occasion to doubt it." To say that each step must be indubitable 
is to say not merely that it is psychologically impossible to doubt it, 
but logically impossible: any challenge to it reinstates it; it is 
self-evident. If each step in the journey, each stone in the 
edifice, each link in the chain7 is indubitable, then the final 
step, stone, link is equally secure; though initially far from 
indubitable, it becomes indubitable by a systematic and rigorous 
application of the method. "Provided only that we abstain from 
receiving anything as true which is not so, and simply retain the 
order which is necessary in order to deduce the one conclusion 
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from the other, there can be nothing so remote that we cannot reach 
it, nor so recondite that we cannot discover it" (H&R, I, 92). 
Without pausing at this point for interpretation, I now 
pass on to the Meditations where we find the method in action: it 
is used there to demonstrate two important propositions in natural 
theology, first, that God exists and, second, that the human soul is 
inunortal, i.e., that it "does not perish with the body." These are 
propositions, Descartes points out, that "it is quite enough for us 
faithful ones to accept by means of faith" but which, if we hope to 
"persuade infidels of any religion," we must prove "by means of the 
natural reason," for infidels lack faith and neither of the two 
propositions is logically self-evident. (H&R, I, 133). 
So far, Descartes' position is completely unexceptional: 
he could be St. Thomas composing the Summa contra Gentiles. What is 
unusual is not the professed aim but the strategy Descartes adopted 
and the points at which the weight of hls argument rests, These 
differences in strategy and emphasis suggest that more considerations 
than merely the expressed aim are operating here. 
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First, as regards the formal structure of the argument: the 
proof does not begin, as it would with Thomas or any medieval theologian, 
with a proof of the existence of God; it begins with a proof of 
Descartes' own existence. And the proof of his own existence is 
preceded by, is dependent upon, systematic doubt of the validity of 
every belief he has ever entertained or might conceivably entertain, 
including especially all beliefs derived from sense perception. For 
instance, can Descartes be sure of what his senses tell him, that he is 
sitting here before his fire, attired in his dressing gown? No; "I 
must remember that ••. I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my 
dreams representing to myself • . things . • even less probable 
than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has 
it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in 
this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, 
whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed!" (H&R, I, 145-46). 
But apart from such episodic sensory illusions (which we 
recognize as illusions as soon as we waken), how, Descartes asks, can he 
be sure that the whole physical world is not a gigantic, permanent 
hallucination? For all he knows (i.e., knows with absolute certainty) 
"some evil genius not less powerful and deceitful, has employed his 
whole energies in deceiving me." Perhaps "the heavens, the earth, 
colours, figures, sound and all other external things are nought but 
the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in 
order to lay traps for my credulity" (H&R, I, 148). Is there anything 
about which such an infinitely powerful and malignant spirit could 
not deceive Descartes? Yes; there is one thing and only one thing: 
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Descartes cannot be deceived about his own existence. Let there be 
"some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever 
employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist 
also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, 
he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think I am something. 
So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, 
we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I 
am, I exist, is necessarily true each Itime that I pronounce it, or 
that I mentally conceive it" (H&R, I, 150). 
Here then is the absolutely firm foundation stone on which 
the subsequent argument will be erected. "I think, therefore I am" 
exactly meets the requirements of the method: it is indubitable, 
because, each time that I try to doubt it, I reaffirm it. In order 
to doubt that I exist, I must exist. From this starting point 
Descartes proceeded, step by step, to prove, first, the existence of 
God and then the existence of the physical world. But these proofs 
seem almost anti-climatic; it is as if the "point" of the Meditations 
had really been to establish his own elcistence. And, as a matter of 
fact, those proofs have been much critllcized by subsequent philosophers 
who, supposing that the whole function of the Meditations in 
Descartes' personal economy was to prove the propositions with which 
it professes to be concerned, conclude that Descartes was a badly 
programmed computer. 
What else, beyond the more or less successful execution of 
the professed aims, is going on in the Meditations? What does the 
form of Descartes' argument -- the ordE~r of presentation, rather than 
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the conclusions presented -- suggest about the background structure 
operative in this argument?8 I have already referred to the way 
Descartes turns the Thomist argument upside down, making the existence 
of God depend on the Descartes' own existence. Another transformation 
is Descartes complete rejection of the Aristotelian method that the 
Thomists had adopted in the domain of natural knowledge. Aristotle's 
method was probablistic and empirical -- it consisted in the collection 
and close inspection of cases, whether these be cases of state 
constitutions or of chicken embryos9 in an attempt to discover, if 
possible, features common to all these cases, though it was never 
supposed by Aristotle that these common features would be exactly 
uniform in all cases, still less that exactly the same procedures 
could be automatically applied in all fields: experience counted 
more than adherence to a set of rules. And as for certainty, he held 
that it is the mark of an educated man not to demand more precision 
of any science than that science is capable of. 10 
Descartes' method, in contrast, aimed at absolute certainty, 
and about Descartes' need for certainty there is not likely to be 
much dispute. He is not the only philosopher to have experienced this 
need -- Dewey, forgetting himself and Nietzsche, thought the "quest" 
for certainty was a hallmark of philosophy -- but he is notable, I 
think, for the intensity of this passion. 
What is my evidence for this assertion? To begin with, let 
us examine the metaphors of the Discourse. The metaphors a philosopher 
uses are a likely place to look for elements in his background 
structure that may be operative in all of his writings but difficult 
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to detect in (say) a passage for formal argl.llIlent. In metaphors the 
control exercised by the argl.llIlent is relaxed, and elements not 
normally visible become visible as they determine the choice of the 
images. 11 Descartes's modal metaphor i.s architectural: it is the 
image of an edifice which may either be precarious because the 
foundations are weak or firm because the foundations are solid. Thus, 
for instance, he writes that in the sciences of his day "one could 
have built nothing solid on foundations: so far from firm" (H&R, I, 86); 
he discusses the desirability of "rebui.lding the house which we 
inhabit" (1, 95) and of "pulling down the old house" (1, 99). But 
all the metaphors of the Discourse have the same expressive force: 
we are travelers lost in the woods who must search for the right 
path (1, 96); we must "reject the quicksand and mud in order to find 
rock or clay" (1, 99); he wants to "walk with confidence"; he has 
"chosen the road" he intends to follow (I, 87). And so on. But we 
do not need to depend on a reading of the metaphors to see what is 
going on in the Discourse; Descartes' tells us quite explicitly 
what his attitudes are.12 He knows, he writes, that "we are all 
subject to delusion" (H&R, I, 83). He has always had "an excessive 
desire to distinguish the true from the false" (H&R, I, 87). Of all 
the subjects he studied in his youth he was most "delighted with 
Mathematics because of the certainty of its demonstrations and the 
evidence of its reasoning" (H&R, I, 85). 
It is in the light of these assertions and metaphors of the 
Discourse that we can now turn back to the Meditations and try to 
interpret what is being expressed in the extraordinary opening moves of 
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the argument. There is the doubt that he is not awake but dreaming; 
there is the possibility that some "very powerful and very cunning 
spirit [has] plotted to deceive him about everything. "If these 
are not mere intellectual exercises, they suggest a neurotic, possibly 
even psychotic, obsession with the dangers to which one is daily 
exposed -- of losing one's way, of missing one's footing in the 
twilight, of falling, of sinking into quicksand, of having the whole 
edifice in which one dwells and in which one foolishly feels secure 
suddenly come crashing down -- in a word, the possibility of accepting 
as true something that is false. Descartes, it would seem, longed to 
escape from the torments of doubt, in much the way that some saint 
yearns to be freed from the contamination of sin. And, just as the 
saint is more scrupulous than the ordinary sinner in searching out the 
secret sin that may be buried in his heart, so Descartes is more 
demanding than the ordinary man in exposing and eliminating every 
possibility, however small, of deception. 
But though Descartes wanted to be reassured about all 
things -- about the existence of God and the existence of the physical 
world -- what chiefly concerned him, we may suspect, was his own 
existence. This explains why he inverted the normal progression of the 
argument, from God to man, and made it run from Descartes to God. 
Descartes' proof of his existence was not important as the logical 
starting point for an argument leading elsewhere (for any self-evident 
proposition could, logically, serve this purpose). It was important 
because it was his existence that was being proved: it was assurance 
on this point that he sought. It was not so much that he doubted his 
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momentary existence -- his existence at this or that moment in time. 
What he wanted reassurance on was his necessary continuous existence 
over time and beyond time. And what ~~ade his continuous existence 
doubtful was his view of the nature of time; time consists in a 
succession of encapsulated moments, each of which is so distinct 
from every other moment that there can be no reason, prima facie, 
why anything happening at any particular moment is connected in any 
way with anything happening at any other moment: "All the course 
of my life may be divided into an infinite number of parts, none of 
which is in any way dependent on the other; and thus from the fact 
that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I 
must be in existence now" (H&R, I, 168). And he added, even more 
explicitly, in his Reply to the First Set of Objections: "I deem 
the various parts of time to be separable from each other, and hence 
it does not follow that, because I nm" exis t, I shall in future 
do so" (H&R, II, 14). 
In a word, and in the language of my world views studies, 
Descartes had an unusually strong discreteness bias, that is, a 
disposition to experience the world as: being only a loose aggregation 
of distinct, encapsulated parts, rathe!r than as being an organic 
unity. His philosophical theory, we Dlay say, has the particular form 
it has because this form expresses the conflict between the cosmological 
orientation and the desire for continuous existence -- just as the 
hitchhiker's gesture has the particular shape it has because this 
shape expresses the discouragement he feels. 
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We can see the sort of background structure that I am 
attributing to Descartes in Antoine Roquetin, the protagonist of 
Sartre's Nausea. Think for instance of the passage in which Sartre 
describes Roquetin's attempt to finish his biography of the Marquis 
of Rollebon: 
How can I, who have not the strength to hold to my own 
past, hope to save the past of someone else? 
I picked up my pen and tried to get back to work. 
But as my eyes fell on the pad of white sheets, I was 
struck by its look and stayed, pen raised, studying this 
dazzling paper ••.• 
The letters I had just inscribed on it were not even 
dry yet and already they belonged to the past. 
r had thought out this sentence, at first it had been 
a small part of myself. Now it was inscribed on the 
paper • . r didn't recognize it any more •• It was 
there, in front of me; in vain for me to trace some sign of 
its origin. Anyone could have written it. But I ••• I 
wasn't sure that r wrote it. The letters glistened no longer, 
they were dry. That had disappeared too. 
r looked anxiously around me: the present, nothing but 
the present. Furniture light and solid, rooted in its present, 
a table, a bed, a closet with a mirror -- and me. The true 
nature of the present revealed itself: it was what exists, and 
all that was not present did not exist. The past did not 
exist. Not at all. Not in things, not even in my 
thoughts •• Now I knew: things are entirely what 
they appear to be -- and behind them • there is 
nothing. • • • An immense sickness flooded over me suddenly 
13 
and the pen fell from my hand •• " • 
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This passage articulates (in highly skillful literary prose) 
elements in the background structure of the fictional Roquetin which 
a real-life Roquetin probably could not, and would not, have 
articulated so explicitly.14 I have quoted it at length because 
my hypothesis is that some features of Descartes' philosophical 
writings -- e.g., the inversion of the standard argument, the focus 
on a method that yields indubitability., the architectural metaphors, 
the confession of his "excessive desire" for certainty are signs 
of a desparate insecurity below the surface similar to that openly 
expressed by the fictional Roquetin. Descartes, too, experienced 
nausea. 
III 
Can we find any supporting evidence for this hypothesis 
in Descartes' record of his dreams? First note some striking 
parallels between the language in which the dreams were recorded and the 
much later language of the philosophical writings: in both there is 
a fear of falling; there is the experience of walking in twilight, 
in a world of shadows; there is the choice of a road to follow in 
life; there is the malus spiritus. Moreover, in both the dreams and the 
Discourse the discovery of the method is central, for the heading of the 
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15 Olympica and the marginal note can hardly refer to anything but the 
new method so sedately described in the Discourse. The Discourse thus 
seems to be the recollection in tranquillity16 of the intense excitement 
he experienced during the night of November 10/11, 1619. 
Turning now from such parallels to the imagery of the 
dreams as Descartes reports them, the first thing that strikes us is 
Descartes' isolation: Phantoms pass before him as he walks in the 
street. Though later on the first dream becomes well populated, the 
people whom he encounters are strangers and they and he are silent. 
He passes the only individual whom he recognizes, missing a chance 
to speak with him. When he is addressed by another individual, he 
does not reply. In the third dream a few disjointed exchanges do 
occur, but they are abortive; nothing like a conversation develops. 
Throughout the dreams Descartes is virtually cut off from human 
contact; he is alone in a silent world. 
The second notable feature of the dreams is the series of 
abrupt transitions. In the first dream he has to shift without warning 
from his right to his left side; he finds himself unexpectedly near 
a college and decides to visit it. In the second dream, the 
illumination is provided by many sparkling lights scattered about. 
In the third dream, a book appears from nowhere and then disappears 
as inexplicably. Another book suddenly appears; then the first 
reappears; when it does, some of its pages are missing; this volume 
is not the one he expected it to be; in turning over the pages he 
comes upon some engravings he had not expected. 
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The third feature is Descartes' desire to control his 
movements and his inability to do so. He is tossed about by a 
whirlwind; he drags himself along; when he decides go into the 
college he is blown there, rather than being able to proceed by his 
own volition; he fails to find the acquaintance whom he has passed; 
he alone of the people in the college quadrangle is bent and 
staggering; he is frustrated when he proposes to read a poem -- he 
cannot find the place. 
All of this, in one way or the other, is imagery of 
discontinuity, temporal and spatial, causal and interpersonal. In 
the dreams the normal pattern of interaction is constantly broken 
interrupted in unpredictable, disturbing ways. From such hazards 
in real life, we would expect Descartes to flee, just as in the dream 
he sought refuge in the college chapel. And this is just what we 
find spelled out in the Discourse: "I resolved to remove myself from 
all places where any acquaintances wer,e possible, and to retire to a 
country . • • where I can live as solitary and retired as in deserts 
the most remote" (R&H, I, 100). So he settled in the Netherlands, 
where he lived in seclusion. In a letter, describing his life in 
Amsterdam, he wrote: "I take my walk every day amidst all this 
confusion of people with as much independence and as repose as you 
know in your own park. And I take no more notice of the men here 
than I would of the trees in your forest or the animals which pass." 
Such relations as he maintained with other people were largely 
conducted by correspondence, rather than by direct personal contact; 
it was interaction at a distance that he preferred. 
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This pattern of life once again suggests Roquetin, who 
spoke of the Self-Taught Man with contempt: "I don't want any 
communion of souls. I haven't sunk so low." In a world which is 
perceived as being fragmented into radically discontinuous states, 
among which interactions must remain unpredictable, Descartes adopted 
the strategy of Roquetin and, for that matter, the strategy of the 
Stoics, "those philosophers who in ancient times were able to free 
themselves from the empire of fortune" (R&H, I, 97). One teaches 
oneself to limit one's desires to the little that, given the nature 
of things, one can expect to achieve. 
And solitude of course did not mean merely escape from the 
hazards of the unexpected. The repose Descarte sought was not 
merely social; it was, even more, intellectual, that is, escape from 
the corroding acid of doubt. These reflections throw some light, 
I think, on Descartes' own interpretation of the melon as the delights 
of solitude. At first sight that is a very puzzling reading: what 
do solitude and a melon have in common that would lead Descartes to 
read this part of his dream in that way? The answer, I believe, is 
that a melon is a self-enclosed, self-contained sphere, firmly 
encapsulated; if it were a self it would be exactly the sort of self 
that Descartes wanted to be, that he desperately doubted he was, 
and that, in the Meditations, it was his first concern to prove 
himself beyond all question to be. 
IV 
So far, the Olympica seems to confirm the reading that I 
proposed for the Discourse and the Meditations. I turn now to a more 
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speculative matter -- Descartes' own reading of the wind that buffeted 
him. Assuredly, because the wind frustrated his desire it was plausible 
to read it as evil, but not as the (or, at least, an) evil spirit. 
Moreover, Descartes' dream encounter with the wind, as he records it, 
cannot possibly account (for the terror that he records himself as 
having experienced. Accordingly, it would seem that Descartes" 
interpretation of the wind was a case of under-reading. In putting 
forward my own interpretation of Descartes' interpretation of the 
dream I shall try to uncover elements present in the waking background 
structure (the one interpreting the dream) that caused it to miss 
important elements in the background structure that was generating the 
dream. 
Before I can do this I must return briefly to that marvelous 
discovery, the method, and point out an aspect of it that I have not 
yet discusses. The method delighted Descartes, I have emphasized, 
because by eliminating doubt it brought him the certainty he sought. 
But he was equally delighted by its universality. Let us therefore 
look at the method once more and from this point of view. It linked 
discrete propositions in long chains in "due order." When some chain 
had been completed each separate proposition was bound at each end 
to another proposition. So far as this particular chain was concerned, 
order had been restored to -- rather, imposed on -- some otherwise 
fragmented segment of the world. But now, if the method was truly 
universal in its application, as Descartes had begun to see, if it 
applied not merely to algebra but to "the other sciences" as well 
C1, 94), if nothing was "too remote" or "too recondite" to be brought 
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within its scope, then in principle everything would be linked in this 
linear fashion to everything else. There would be a single, immensely 
long proposition in which every truth about the universe would be 
formulated; nothing would be left out, everything would have its proper 
place. Accordingly, the sciences -- which in Descartes' day had the 
appearance of "those ancient cities which, originally mere villages, 
become in the process of time large towns, [with] large buildings 
and small buildings indiscrimately placed together, thus rendering the 
streets crooked and irregular" -- would be brought into "the uniformity 
of a rational scheme" (H&R, I, 87-89). 
Of course, this would not be the same as, not so satisfactory 
as, knowing everything all at once, in a single inclusive intuition. 
But it would be the next best thing, and it would assuredly be the 
best knowledge that is possible in a universe that was itself only an 
aggregation of discrete entities. No wonder, then, that Descartes was 
exalted when he realized the potentialities of his newly discovered 
method -- especially if, as we may suspect, the discovery of the method 
saved him from following a seductive alternative path. 
Here one thinks of Goethe's Faust. Like the Faust of the 
first monologue, the Descartes of the Discourse had run through the 
curriculum in philosophy, medicine, law and even theology. And like 
Faust, at the end of his studies he found himself just as learned as 
he was before he began. Descartes had even tried and found wanting 
the life of action, the great book of the world, which the Faust of 
the first monologue had still before him. Like Faust again, what 
Descartes wanted above all was insight into the heart of things -- was 
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die Welt in immersten zusammenhalt. Or, in Descartes' own language, 
in a letter to Beekman, written in the spring of that momentous 
year, 1619: "I want to penetrate to the very heart of the kingdom 
of knowledge." And like Faust, Descartes was convinced that there 
must be some key which, if he could but find it, would open the 
sealed door, enable him to escape from those "crooked and irregular" 
streets in Which he felt enclosed, and give him an understanding of the 
whole all at once. tota simul. 
Perhaps, like the Faust of the first monologue and frustrated 
by the failure of "one of the most celebrated Schools of Europe" to 
provide this key, he too had turned to magic. In Faust's case, as we 
know, the spirit that magic evoked proved to be a schreckliches Gesicht; in 
Descartes' case perhaps it was the malus spiritus that terrified him in 
his dream, whose memory years later still haunted the pages of the 
Meditations. 
If Descartes had indeed dabbled in magic, it is not 
surprising that he felt an anxiety that is expressed in the images of the 
first dream. For there was not merely the matter of social 
disapprobation; there was also the possibility of contamination and 
even damnation, all very unnerving for a young man of Descartes' 
cautious disposition.17 If he had dabbled in magic it is not 
surprising that he would have experienced terror in the course of his 
encounter with the evil spirit of the first dream; nor is it 
surprising that he felt a corresponding relief in the third dream 
when it appeared that, after all, he had not traveled too far down 
the magical road to retreat, and that the option of choosing the right 
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path -- the path of reason and science -- was still open to him. 
Read in this way the "Quod vitae sectabor?" is more 
sinister than it appears to be either at the surface of the dream 
or in Descartes interpretation of it. In the surface meaning of the 
dream it is merely the old Pythagorean choice between the active and 
h 1 . l' f 18 h' . " bl d t e contemp atlve l ej lS lnterpretatlon lS even more an: 
the poem is "the good advice of a wise person or even Moral Theology." 
And the "Est et Non," other poem that appears in the dream, is 
interpreted in the same way, as repeating the Pythagorean choice. That, 
indeed, is what the title suggests, but the poem is about something 
else altogether. It is actually an attack on discursive reasoning 
as an arid, meaningless exercise. And that is exactly the criticism 
of reason that the magical world view, with its emphasis on totality, 
would launch. 
Now what is interesting about all this is that the "Est et 
Non" was handed to Descartes by a man whom he did not know and that 
when Descartes sought to find it in the Corpus Poetarum he could not 
locate it. Instead, he proposed to read to the man the "more 
beautiful" (and, we may note, safer) "Quod vitae sectabor iter?" It 
thus looks as if the dream were suppressing the attack on reason that it 
contains in order to make the magical path look less inviting. If 
that is the case, perhaps the choice between the two paths had not yet 
been firmly made. 
But of course no hint of any of this appears in the dream 
itself, still lest in Descartes' interpretation of it: In the dream 
it is only the easy choice between the life of action and the life of 
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contemplation that Descartes faces. In the interpretation there were 
indeed warnings (in the first two dreams) that his life had not 
been "as innocent in the eyes of God as it was to men," but there is 
no suggestion of what he must have thought the warning was a warning about. 
And in the interpretation he is already on the right path. The warning 
is really unnecessary, for the spirit of God had already "made him take 
his first steps toward the church." That is, armed with his new 
method, he is safely embarked on the path of science and reason. 
If my interpretation of Descartes' interpretation of the 
dream is not an over-reading, all of this is superficial, though it 
presumably functions successfully to allay the anxieties of the dreamer. 
The only feature of Descartes' interpretation that seems to me at all 
"deep" was his reading of the encyclopedia as "nothing more than all 
the branches of learning brought together." That is exactly what 
he thought the universality of his marvelous new method would accomplish. 
Perhaps he did not allow himself to dream of the dangers of the 
magical path until the night following thlc day in which the discovery 
of the mirabilis scientiae fundamentum had held out to him the 
possibility of an alternative, safer path. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* John Benton has translated this report for this seminar. See pp. 32-41. 
1. I have been wryly amused to note that in the first edition of 
A History of Western Philosophy I do not so much as mention the 
dreams, whilst in the second edition I allot them but ten lines. 
2. In earlier papers I have defined a "cultural product" as anything 
that results from process in which some medium (words, pigment on 
canvas, modit bodily movements) has been organized by a background 
structure (feelings, beliefs, attitudes). The product "expresses" 
the operative background structure; some of what is thus expressed 
may be intended; much, however, is always implicit and unintended. 
3. John Russell, "Shedding New Light on Monet," New York Times, 
14 October 1979. 
4. These have recently become accessible in volume 3 of Daniel 
Wildenstein's Claude Monet: Vie et Oeuvre. 
5. Discourse on Method, translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 
in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge University 
Press, 1931), Vol. I, pp. 83-86. (Cited hereafter as H&R.) 
6. The Dioptrics and the Metero10gy were both published in 1637; the 
work on physics (Le Monde) had been finished as early as 1634 but 
was withheld from publication because of Descartes' alarm at the 
hostile ecclesiastical reaction to Ga1ileo's Dialogues. 
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7. The metaphors are all Cartesian. 
8. This corresponds to attending to the shape the ride-thumbing 
gesture takes on this particular occasion and asking what else it 
expresses, in addition to whatever it happens to tell us about 
the hiker's desire for a ride. 
9. As a preliminary for his study of politics, Aristotle collected 
data on the constitutions of 158 Greek cities. For his work on 
the chicken embryo, see the Historia Animalium, VI, 3. 
10. Nic. Ethics, I, 3. 
11. By "modal metaphor" I mean simply the most frequently recurring 
metaphor. 
12. It is not only that the hiker's gesture looks discouraged; he 
says that he feels discouraged. 
13. Nausea, translated by L. Alexander (New Directions, 1959) pp. 130-31. 
14. But possibly elements in the background structure of the real-life 
Sartre. 
15. John Benton has pointed out (see note I, appended to his translation) 
that "1620," which appears in the text of Baillet's Life (as Adam 
30 
and Tannery print it) does not appear in the inventory of 1650 
(as Adam and Tannery print that document). We must therefore 
conclude either that the date has been inadvertently omitted from 
the inventory or inadvertently inserted in the text. I believe 
that the latter mistake is the more likely: it is intrinsically 
inplausible to suppose that a whole year passed before Descartes 
"began to understand the basis" of his method, and in any event 
the Discourse suggests that he at once began to put it to work. 
Moreover, and finally, an exact coincidence in date is difficult 
to accept: that is the sort of thing one expects to find, and 
does find, in the Vita Nuova, but not in Descartes. 
16. At the start of the Discourse Descartes enjoins his reader to 
regard "this Treatise as a history, or, if you prefer it, a fable" 
(I, 83). In other words, I shall not lie to you, but do not 
assume that I shall tell you the whole truth. 
17. Since I developed this notion of Descartes as a tentative magician 
I have read Frances Yates' review of Symphorien Champier and the 
Reception of the Occultist Tradition in Renaissance France (NYRB, 
XXVI, 18, Nov. 22, 1979). Taken together, the review and the book 
show that an interest in the occult and the magical was widespread 
in sixteenth and early seventeenth century France and that this 
interest was accompanied by fear of heresy and also by fear of 
"the forces they might be invoking, anxiety to keep on the safe side 
in dealing with them." At the end of her review, and after 
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referring to Newton's concealment of his interest in alchemy, 
Yates asks, "Does this concealment of part of their outlook also 
affect other famous figures, for example, Descartes?" 
18. This is the version of the choice which the Discourse also described 
him as having faced: he decided, h,e says, "to be a spectator 
rather than an actor in all the comedies the world displays" 
(H&R, I, 99). 
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DESCARTES'S OLYMPICA 
The text which follows is a translation of a seventeenth-
century French paraphrase and translation by Adrien Baillet of the 
Latin text in which Descartes recorded three dreams he had in the 
night of 10 November 1619, when he was twenty-three years old. Only 
a few fragments of the first-person Latin record survive, though 
there is enough to show that the French paraphrase was reasonably 
accurate. 
He [Descartes} informs us that on 10 November 1619, after 
going to bed full of inspiration and completely absorbed by the thought 
of having that very day discovered the foundations of marvelous 
knowledge, 1 he had in a single night three consecutive dreams, which 
he believed could only have come from on high. After going to sleep, 
his imagination was struck by the appearance of some phantoms who 
appeared to him and who frightened him so much that, thinking he was 
walking through the streets, he was forced to turn over on his left 
side in order to get to the place where he wanted to go, because he 
felt a great weakness on his right side, on which he could not support 
himself. Ashamed of proceeding in this fashion, he made an effort to 
stand up, but he felt a wind-storm which, carrying him along in a sort 
of whirlwind, made him make three or four pirouettes on his left foot. 
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So far this did not frighten him. The difficulty he had in dragging 
15 himself along made him expect to fall at each step, until he saw along 
his route an open college and went int() it to find shelter and a 
remedy for his problem. He tried to rl~ach the college chapel, where 
he first thought he would go to pray, but realizing that he had 
passed a man of his acquaintance without greeting him, he wished to 
20 retrace his steps to address him properly and was violently hurled 
back by the wind which blew against thE~ church. At the same time he 
saw in the middle of the college courtyard someone else, who in a 
respectful and polite fashion called him by name and said to him 
that if he was willing to go find Monsieur N., he had something to 
25 give him. M. Descartes fancied that it was a melon which had been 
imported from some foreign country. But what surprised him more was 
to see that the people who joined this man in gathering around to 
converse with him were erect and steady on their feet, while he, 
standing in the same place, remained bent and staggering, and that 
30 the wind, which he had thought several times would blow him over, had 
greatly diminished. With this fancy in mind he woke up, and at that 
moment he felt a sharp pain, which made' him fear lest this be the 
working of some evil spirit which wished to captivate him. Immediately 
he turned on his right side, for he had gone to sleep and had the 
35 dream on his left side. He prayed to God to ask protection against 
the evil spirit of his dream and to be preserved from all the 
misfortunes which could threaten him as a damnation for his sins, 
which he realized were serious enough to draw anathema on his head, 
although until then he had led a life which men found irreproachable. 
40 
34 
In this state he went to sleep again, after an interval of 
nearly two hours of various thoughts on the blessings and evils of 
this world. Immediately he had a new dream in which he believed he 
heard a sharp and shattering nOise, which he took for a clap of thunder. 
The fright it gave him woke him directly, and after opening his eyes 
'IS he perceived many sparkling lights scattered about the room. The 
same thing had often happened to him at other times and it was not 
very unusual for him, when he awoke in the middle of the night, to 
have his. eyes clear enough to catch a glimpse of the objects 
closest to him. On this particular occasion, however, he wished to 
50 recur to explanations taken from Philosophy, and he drew from it 
conclusions satisfactory to his mind, after having observed, 
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by alternately opening and then closing his eyes, the quality of the 
sensible forms which appeared before him. Thus his fear was dispelled 
and he fell asleep again with considerable composure. 
A moment later he had a third dream, which unlike the first 
two contained nothing frightening. In this last dream he found a 
book on his table, without knowing who had put it there. He opened 
it, and seeing that it was an encyclopedia [Dictionnaire] he was 
delighted, hoping that it could be of great use to him. At the same 
60 instant he felt under his hand another book, equally new to him, 
without knowing where it had come from. He found that it was an 
anthology of poems by different authors called the Corpus Poetarum. 2 
He was drawn by the desire to read something in it and on opening the 
book, he fell on the verse 
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1 
Quod vitae sectabor iter? etc. [What path of life shall I pursue?] 
At the same moment he became aware of a man he did not know, 
who handed him a piece of poetry, beginning with "Est & Nou,,,4 
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and who praised it to him as an excellent composition. M. Descartes 
told him that he knew what it was, and that this poem was one of the 
70 Idylls of Ausonius contained in the big anthology of poetry on his 
table. He wanted to show it to the man and began to leaf through the 
book, whose order and arrangement he prided himself on knowing 
thoroughly. While he was looking for thl~ place, the man asked him 
where he had gotten the book, and M. Descartes replied that he could 
75 not say how he had it, but that a moment before he had been handling 
another book, which had just disappeared" without knowing who had 
brought it to him nor who had removed it.. He had not finished before 
he saw the book reappear at the other end of the table. But he found 
that the encyclopedia was no longer complete as it had appeared the 
80 first time. Meanwhile he went on to the poems of Ausonius, in 
the anthology of poetry through which he was leafing, and being unable 
to find the poem which begins "Est & Non," he said to the man that 
he knew another by the same poet which was even more beautiful than 
this one, and that it began "Quod vitae sec tabor iter?" The man asked 
85 him to show it to him, and M. Descartes set about to look for it, when 
he came upon several copper-plate engravi.ngs [gravez en taille douce} 
of small portraits. This led him to say that the book was quite 
handsome, but that it was not the same edition as that with which he 
was familiar. s He was just at that point when the books and the man 
90 disappeared and faded away from his imagination, without, however, 
waking him. The remarkable thing to note here is that, while wondering 
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if what he had just seen was a dream or a vision, he not only decided 
in his sleep that it was a dream, but he had interpreted it before 
he awoke. He decided that the encyclopedia meant nothing other 
95 than all the branches of learning brought together, and that the 
anthology of poems, called the Corpus poetarum, indicated in particular 
and in a most precise fashion Philosophy and Wisdom joined together. 
Indeed, he did not believe that one should be so very astonished to 
see that the poets, even those who write nothing but twaddle, were 
100 full of sayings more serious, more sensible, and better expressed 
than those found in the writings of the philosophers. He attributed 
this marvel to the divinity of Inspiration and to the power of 
Imagination, which produce the seeds of wisdom (which are found in 
the spirit of all men, like sparks of fire in pieces of flint) with 
105 much greater ease and even much greater brilliance than Reason can 
produce in philosophers. 6 M. Descartes continued to interpret his 
dream in his sleep, judging that the poem on the uncertainty of the 
type of life one should choose, which begins by Quod vitae sec tabor 
iter?, indicated the good advice of a wise person, or even Moral 
110 Theology. 
At this moment, wondering if he was dreaming or thinking, 
he woke up unperturbed, and with his eyes open continued the 
interpretation of his dream along the same line. By the poets 
collected in the anthology he understood the Revelation and the 
115 Inspiration by which he did not despair of seeing himself favored. 
By the poem Est & Non, which is the Yes and the No of Pythagoras 
[marginal note: val xai oV], he understood Truth and Falsity in 
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human understanding and profane learning. Seeing that the application 
of all these things succeeded in suiting him so satisfactorily, he 
120 was bold enough to conclude that the Spirit of Truth had chosen to 
use this dream to reveal the treasures of all the disciplines of 
learning to him. All that remained for him to explain were the little 
engraved portraits which he had found in the second book, and he no 
longer sought their explanation after an Italian painter paid him a 
125 visit no later than the next day.' 
This last dream, which contained nothing but the most 
pleasant and agreeable things, seemed to him to indicate the future, 
and it was limited to those things which should happen to him in the 
remainder of his life. But he took the two earlier dreams as warnings 
130 concerning his past life, which might not have been as innocent in the 
eyes of God as it was to men. And he believed that this was the 
reason for the terror and fright which aecompanied these two dreams. 
The melon which someone wanted to give him in the first dream, he 
said, signified the delights of solitude, though presented by purely 
135 human appeals. The wind which blew him toward the college chapel, 
when his right side was hurting him, was nothing other than the evil 
Spirit which tried to throw him forcefully into a place where he had 
planned to go of his own free will. [A marginal note by Descartes 
read, "A malt> Spiritu ad Templum propellebar" -- I was driven to the 
140 Church by the Devil.) 
This is why God did not permit him to go further and let him 
be carried, even to a holy place, by a Spirit which He had not sent, 
although he was convinced that it had been the Spirit of God which 
145 
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had made him make his first steps toward this church. The fear which 
struck him in the second dream indicated, in his opinion, his 
synteresis, that is, the prick of conscience concerning the sins 
which he could have committed up to that point in his life. The 
thunder which he heard was the signal of the Spirit of Truth which 
descended on him to take possession of him. 
This last imaginative interpretation surely smacks of 
Inspiration, and it would easily lead us to believe that M. Descartes 
might have been drinking the evening before he went to bed. It was, 
indeed, the eve of Martinmas, an evening when it was customary in the 
place where he was, as in France, to devote oneself to revelry.s But he 
assures us that he had passed the whole day and the evening in complete 
sobriety, and that it had been three months since he had last drunk 
wine. He adds that the Spirit which excited in him the inspiration 
which he had felt affecting his brain for several days had predicted 
these dreams before he retired to bed, and that his human spirit had 
no part in it. 
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NOTES 
Translated. by John F. Benton from Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles 
Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris, 1897-1913), X, 179-186. Suggestions 
for improving the translation will bE! welcome. For literature see 
Lewis S. Feuer, "The Dreams of Descartes," American Imago 20 (1963), 
3-26; cf. Freud, Complete Works 21, 203-204. Marie-Louise von Franz's 
Jungian paper of 1952 on the dream has been translated in Timeless 
Documents of the Soul (Evanston, Ill.., 1968), pp. 55-147. 
1. The Latin text of the opening sentence was transcribed: "X. 
Novembris 1619, cum plenus forem Enthousiasmo, et mirabilis 
scientiae fundamenta reperirem." A marginal note at the beginning 
of the work read: "XI. Novembris:, coepi intelligere fundamentum 
inventi mirabilis" -- 11 November I began to understand the basis 
of the marvelous discovery. This: is the form given in the inventory 
of Descartes' papers published in the Oeuvres de Descartes, X, 7. 
The sentence quoted in Baillet's Vie, as printed in Oeuvres de 
Descartes, X, 179, adds the year 1620. Is this an error or did 
Descartes take a year to begin his understanding? 
2. A marginal note read: Divided in five books, printed at Lyon and 
Geneva, etc. This information helps to identify the work as the 
Corpus omnium veterum poetarum laltinorum, edited by Pierre de 
Brosses, which appeared in two edlitions before 1619, the first at 
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Lyon in 1603, the second at Geneva in 1611. The Corpus was "big," 
being composed of two volumes in quarto, the first of 1426 pages 
and the second of 888 pages (895 in the 1611 edition). 
3. The poem, entitled Ex Graeco Pythagoricum, de ambiguitate 
eligendae vitae, Edyllium XV, was printed in vol. II of the Corpus, 
p. 655 (first edition), or p. 658 (second edition). It is printed 
with an English translation as Eclogue 2 in Ausonius, ed. H. G. E. 
White, Loeb Library (2 vols., London, 1919), I, 162-169. On 
Ausonius' Eclogue and the crossroads of Pythagoras, see S. K. 
Heninger, Jr., Touches of Sweet Harmony (San Marino, CA, 1974), 
pp. 269-271. 
4. The poem Est et Non is the fourth Eclogue of Ausonius, ed. White, 
ibid., pp. 170-173. The poem vigorously attacks empty dialectic 
debate. According to Norman K. Smith, New Studies in the 
Philosophy of Descartes (London, 1952), p. 35, the two poems of 
Ausonius appear on the same page of the 1603 edition of the 
Corpus poetarum, the edition which Descartes surely used at the 
Jesuit College of La Fleche, and on facing pages of the edition 
of 1611. 
5. Neither of the editions of the Corpus printed before 1619 contained 
copper-plate engravings. 
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6. This passage is very close to the Latin of the Cogitationes 
privatae, printed in Oeuvres, X, 217: Mirum videripossit, quare 
graves sententiae in scriptis poetarum, magis quam philosophorum. 
Ratio est quod poetae per enthusiasmum et vim imaginationis 
scripsere: sunt in nobis seminal scientiae, ut in silice, quae 
per rationem a philosophis educuntur per imaginationem a poet is 
excutiuntur magisque elucent. 
7. This passage is the only indication that Descartes considered 
a detail of the dream predictive,. 
8. Descartes was with the imperial army at Neuberg on the Danube 
when he had this dream. Three months before (when he had last 
drunk wine) he attended the coronation of the emperor Ferdinand 
II at Francfort. 
